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The ‘T’ Word 
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Conor Gearty in his effusive Irish Times review of Richard English’s Terrorism: How 
to Respond, describes the latter as “a benign lifeguard, wading through a sea of 
teeming, turbulent mediocrity to rescue their drowning minds with the power of his 
intellect.” ‘They’ are academics specialising in terrorism and the “sea of teeming, 
turbulent mediocrity” the academic literature on terrorism. Gearty lauds English’s text 
as variously “outstanding,” “beautifully written,” “thoroughly on top of its subject,” a 
“prodigious achievement.” And it is a good book, though not one without flaws, and 
owing a huge debt to the very ‘mediocre’ literature(s) that Gearty dismisses. 
 
An Historian by training, Richard English is Professor of Politics and Head of the 
School of Politics, International Studies, and Philosophy at Queens University Belfast 
where he teaches Irish history and politics. He is the author of, amongst other titles, 
Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (2006) and Armed Struggle: 
The History of the IRA (2003). Indeed, English’s solid grasp of Irish Republicanism is 
used to great effect in the present work, one of the most noteworthy aspects of which 
is his call, for academic and policymakers both, to learn from the past in order to 
respond more effectively to future terrorism. He then puts his own advice into action 
by devoting a large portion of his analysis to the lessons to be learned from the 
specific British-Irish experience of terrorism and responses to it and how these may 
be compared and contrasted to both historical cases of terrorism and the contemporary 
jihadi threat. 
 
English’s text is short, running to just 143 pages of analysis—with a further 21 pages 
of endnotes and 9 pages of bibliography—and divided into just four chapters. Each 
chapter is concerned with a single central question, as follows: What is terrorism? 
Why do people resort to terror? What can we learn from terrorism past? How should 
we respond? The first chapter is therefore concerned with the problem of 
definition(s), the second with the causes of terrorism, chapter three with the lessons of 
history, and the final chapter with proper counter-terrorist responses.  
 
Chapter one begins with an arresting vignette regarding Gerry Adams and Martin 
McGuinness playing with Tony Blair’s children in the garden of 10 Downing Street, 
which English uses to underline terrorism’s “many problems of definition” (p.2, 
italics in original). He lays out what he views as the eight major definitional problems 
in a structured fashion, discussing, in turn, the difficulty that there exist so many 
competing definitions of terrorism; the differences between ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’; 
the complicated relationship between states and terrorism and thence defining 
terrorism through reference to the identity of its perpetrator; the problem of defining 
terrorism based upon the identity of targets; the problem of defining terrorism by the 
kinds of attacks carried out or methods used; the problem that many terrorism 
campaigns are carried out by groups that also engage in other types of violent activity 
(e.g. guerrilla warfare, insurgency) and therefore which type of violence to prioritise 
in terms of group definition; the problem of change over time (e.g. the debates over 
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‘new’ terrorism, nuclear terrorism, etc.); and, finally, the fact that the term ‘terrorism’ 
is not a neutral, technical term, but a pejorative.  
 
Given the above, English then asks if we should simply abandon “the ‘T’ word” 
(p.21). The short answer is ‘no,’ but what then are we to do given the problems 
raised? I appreciated the suggestion to employ the Wittgensteinian notion of ‘family 
resemblances,’ which would allow for understanding the similarities and differences 
amongst terrorisms; English himself dismisses this approach as “unnecessarily 
elusive,” however (p.22). Instead he draws our attention to the analysis of terrorism as 
a sub-species of war—‘family resemblance,’ anyone?—for which he makes a good 
case. He follows this up with his own definition of terrorism as follows: 
 
“terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political 
aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an 
important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly 
threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing 
political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and 
implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it 
represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider 
campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage” (p.24).  
 
One interesting aspect of the latter is that it underlines the communicative aspects of 
terrorism, which English doesn’t really address in his analysis of definitions. In fact, if 
I were to point to one significant omission from the slate of definitions of terrorism 
provided in this chapter, I would be inclined to point to Schmid and Jongman’s classic 
scholarly definition (1988), which also emphasises terrorism as a form of 
communication, but which is not mentioned in this text. 
 
Chapter two deals with the causes of terrorism. It’s entitled ‘Why do people resort to 
terror?’ which is puzzling when one considers the authors assertion in the previous 
chapter “that the literal sense of the word ‘terrorism’ misleadingly suggests a 
distinctively central role for ‘terror’ itself” (p.7). Nevertheless, the chapter provides a 
good short introduction to this vast area, with English weighing the opportunities and 
potential difficulties of five approaches or types of explanation: psychological 
explanations; a civilisational approach (à la Huntington); the explanation from 
religion; the strategic viewpoint; and—the author’s preferred approach—the 
explanation from politics, within which is emphasised the explanation from 
nationalism. The importance of ethnicity and of broad social explanations as 
components of the explanation from politics are also mentioned here, but are not 
unfortunately discussed.   
 
A comment here regarding the discussion of suicide terrorism in the section on 
explanations from religion: the author, in an aside, remarks “the radically religious do 
seem more likely than others to engage in suicide attacks, and that such attacks are 
more likely to target members of other religions than to target co-religionists” (p.36). 
Robert Pape’s data shows that between 1980 – 2001, more religiously-inspired than 
secular groups engaged in suicide terrorism (2003, 15 – 18) and, given the rise in 
jihadi suicide terrorism post-9/11 and the recent demise of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), 
this trend is likely upward. The second observation strikes me as factually inaccurate 
however; in fact, precisely because of the upswing in suicide terrorist attacks by 
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jihadists, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also elsewhere, many of which 
feature heavy Muslim casualties. The Jordanian hotel bombings in November 2005 
killed 56 people and wounded a further 96, the majority of whom were Muslims, for 
example.   
 
Chapter three is the longest of the book’s four chapters. It is divided into two parts, 
with the same questions—Why do significant terrorist campaigns begin? How are 
terrorist campaigns sustained? Why does terrorism end?—addressed in each.  The 
questions are explored in the context of, first, the specific case of the Provisional IRA 
and followed-up by reflecting on the extent to which lessons learned from the Irish 
case may be applied to terrorism more generally. It’s in this chapter that English’s 
familiarity with the IRA really finds an outlet. The chapter includes an illuminating 
(indirect) comparison between the IRA and al-Qaeda in which the latter’s actions are 
seen to be explainable in similar terms to those of the former. I’m not entirely 
convinced by this argument, but I certainly think that this chapter can be fruitfully 
read in conjunction with the direct comparison between the IRA and al-Qaeda 
undertaken by Peter Neumann in his Old and New Terrorism (2009, Ch. 2), in which 
Neumann comes to the conclusion that the IRA were a classic ‘old’ terrorist outfit and 
al-Qaeda and company are emphatically ‘new.’ While not dismissing English’s 
argument(s) out of hand, one aspect of what he has to say struck me particularly in 
this regard: “vital effort must be put internationally into persuading, enticing, or 
manipulating terrorist leaderships towards a recognition that post-terrorism will prove 
more fruitful for them than terrorism” (p.127). What’s to be done though if ‘new’ 
terrorism is characterised not by the existence of terrorist ‘groups’ as commonly 
understood, but loose networks of individuals acting out of a commitment to ‘al-
Qaedism’ rather than al-Qaeda? In other words, what if there is no leadership to talk 
to or, put another way, what if there now exist an unknown number of petit leaders 
with whom one might talk, but whom can’t be identified? There are no satisfactory 
answers to these questions available in this text.  
 
The book’s final chapter is concerned with practical responses for the future that draw 
on lessons learned from terrorism past. English puts forward seven key pieces of 
advice here: we must learn to live with terrorism; where possible, its underlying root 
problems and causes should be addressed; the over militarization of response should 
be avoided; intelligence is the most vital element in successful counter-terrorism and 
should be invested in and improved; orthodox legal frameworks should be adhered to, 
as should the democratically established rule of law; security-related, financial, and 
technological preventative measures should be more highly coordinated; and strong 
credibility should be maintained in counter-terrorist public argument. This, though not 
new, is sound advice. In fact, in the final analysis, this could be said of the whole 
book: it says little that has not been said before, but collects the research and writing 
of many persons, disciplines, and decades, weighs it up in a clear and accessible way, 
with remarkable brevity and, in doing so, makes a good case for contextualised, 
historically-informed analysis of contemporary terrorist threats. It is thus 
recommended.  
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